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REVIEW ESSAYS
the case for hard power
Dov S. Zakheim
The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power & the Necessity of Mili-
tary Force, by Eliot A� Cohen� New York: Basic Books, 2016� 
285 pages� $27�99�
Eliot Cohen’s The Big Stick is a well-crafted paean to muscular interventionism� 
Its central argument is that only the United States can ensure international stabil-
ity; that it can do so only if it continues to maintain the military superiority that 
has enabled it to dominate international affairs since the Second World War; and 
that to be credible it must be both ready and willing to employ force even when 
its more narrowly defined national interests are not being challenged� The book 
is neither a neoconservative nor a liberal-interventionist tract� Yet it is notewor-
thy that these are the only two political ideologies that essentially escape Cohen’s 
critical pen�
Cohen argues that America, and only America, can preserve global order� He 
recognizes that Americans are war weary; the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are 
well into their second decades, with no end in sight� Yet he asserts that, just as 
withdrawal from either country would harm American interests seriously—he 
notes that President Obama belatedly came to the same conclusion—so too 
would American reluctance to go to war whenever and wherever the internation-
al order again comes under serious threat� For that 
reason he rightly has very little good to say about 
neo-isolationism, or, to be more precise, a return 
to America’s strategic posture prior to its entry into 
the First World War� It is no longer enough, he 
posits, to focus solely on narrow self-interests and 
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self-defense, even if leavened by participation in the global market and member-
ship in the United Nations� There simply are no good alternatives to American 
leadership� The kind of global order that a China or a Russia might impose, as-
suming that it has the ability to impose any order at all, would undermine the 
values that Americans and the citizens of their allies hold most dear�
In making his case against not only neo-isolationism but the downgrading of 
the centrality of force in American security policy, Cohen critiques five variations 
of arguments to support a modern-day version of the posture first articulated 
by George Washington in his Farewell Address� Cohen is highly skeptical of the 
case put forth by Steven A� Pinker, among others, that the world is becoming a 
more peaceful place and America no longer need act as the world’s policeman� 
Cohen rightly points out that the trends that underlie Pinker’s calculations are 
belied by the horrific number of deaths in the two world wars, in particular� 
Moreover, Cohen argues that a significant reason for the decline in the number 
and magnitude of wars since the end of the Second World War is the dominant, 
and generally benign, influence of the United States on the international security 
environment� Statecraft matters: the choices politicians make can and do mean 
the difference between war and peace� As he puts it, “the deliberate action of one 
state above all—the United States—has had something to do with the relative 
peacefulness of the world after 1945� � � � [I]t follows that an American decision 
to stop acting that way could yield a far nastier twenty-first century than the one 
Pinker expects” (p� 10)�
A prominent critic of the Trump administration during its first months in 
office, Cohen also assails the notion—dear to both the Clinton and Obama ad-
ministrations (especially the latter)—that it was the employment of soft power 
that most effectively furthered American interests worldwide� Soft power is the 
concept that Harvard University professor Joseph Nye developed to describe the 
noncoercive ability to shape the preferences of others through the attractiveness 
of culture, political values, and foreign policies� Cohen does not reject the notion 
of soft power entirely, but his argument is that without the availability, and at cru-
cial times the employment, of credible hard power, soft power cannot be relied on 
to protect America’s interests and those of its allies or others whom it might wish 
to support� He focuses on the limits of sanctions, and offers examples to under-
score his contention that soft power is not enough� Sanctions may have brought 
Iran to the negotiating table, but they did not put a halt to its nuclear program� 
Nor have sanctions stopped Russia from annexing Crimea or supporting Ukrai-
nian separatists� Sanctions are indiscriminate, and often penalize a state’s inno-
cent populace more than its guilty leaders� Once sanctions are removed—as they 
were, for example, under the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 
better known as the Iran nuclear deal—they are almost impossible to restore�
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Cohen acknowledges that sanctions are an important tool of foreign policy, 
and at times are highly effective, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia being 
prime examples� Given the limitations of sanctions, however, Cohen feels that 
hard power needs to be mustered to assure the United States that its policy goals 
will be met; in the case of Iran, he seems to call for a blockade of that country’s 
shipborne commerce� He fails to examine what the Iranian reaction might be—
the very second- and third-order consequences that worry him when discussing 
sanctions—or whether a blockade would involve the United States in yet another 
Middle Eastern war� Nor does he outline how hard power might be applied to 
prize Crimea from Vladimir Putin’s clutches�
Cohen has little time for those who argue that America should not act as the 
world’s policeman simply because of its “irreducible strategic incompetence” 
(p� 19)� He examines several variants of their position, all of which derive from 
the assertion that America’s wars since the Second World War have not been 
particularly successful� For example, some argue that America’s bureaucratic 
“pathologies” prevent it from exploiting American military power to its greatest 
effect, while others go further and assert that American intervention is more 
destructive than salutary�
Cohen rightly notes that inaction can be as dangerous as action� Moreover, not 
all American wars have been failures: both the Korean War, which literally saved 
South Korea, and the 1991 Gulf War are very much examples to the contrary� 
Cohen goes further, however� Even the Vietnam War was not, in Cohen’s view, a 
complete failure, since, as Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew put it, the war “bought time 
for the rest of southeast Asia�” Cohen may go too far in seeking a silver lining for 
the Iraq War� Perhaps, as he asserts, “the story is not yet fully written” (p� 21)� Still, 
it is a bit much to argue for the value of removing a dictator with nuclear ambi-
tions when those ambitions were not remotely realized, and in the face of both 
ongoing chaos in Iraq and Iran’s increasing domination of Iraq, to a degree that 
would have been impossible had Saddam remained in power�
Cohen quickly puts paid to the argument, enunciated by President Obama, 
that the United States should concentrate on “nation building at home�” He notes 
that defense spending as a percentage of gross national product was considerably 
lower during the Obama era than during most of the Cold War, which neverthe-
less witnessed major domestic initiatives ranging from Medicare and Medicaid to 
the Clean Air Act� The Trump administration actually agrees with its predecessor 
that one cannot acquire both guns and butter on a massive scale, but its budget 
assigns a higher priority to increased defense spending at the expense of numer-
ous domestic programs� Cohen’s advocacy of higher spending for both military 
and nonmilitary programs reflects a cherished view common to all intervention-
ists, whether of the neocon or the liberal variety� It is a policy that was enunciated 
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forcefully by the liberal Democratic senator Henry M� Jackson, a consistently 
strong supporter of the Vietnam War, whose acolytes include interventionists 
such as Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Frank Gaffney, and Elliott Abrams�
Cohen reserves his most trenchant critique for so-called realists� He ascribes 
to realists the view that “the world having resolved itself [after the Second World 
War and the Cold War] into a more familiar pattern of competing powers, the 
United States has far less need to meddle in matters abroad” (p� 11)� Just as Cohen 
cites Nye as the father of soft-power theory, so he cites John Mearsheimer as the 
archetypal “realist�” But whereas Nye truly did conceive of the concept with which 
he is associated, Mearsheimer hardly represents all, or even most, realists� After 
all, Mearsheimer considers interventionist foreign policy elites to be, as Cohen 
puts it, “the chief threat to the United States”—a position that actually mirrors the 
“irreducible strategic incompetence” school of thought�
More characteristic of the realist position are the views, and the actions while 
in office, of President George H� W� Bush, his Secretary of State James Baker, and 
Brent Scowcroft, his assistant to the president for national security affairs (known 
as the national security adviser)� That team, which many consider to have con-
stituted the most competent national security leadership since the Second World 
War, was hardheaded enough to play at most a limited role as the Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact collapsed, and, for that matter, with regard to intervening 
on behalf of the Kurdish and Shia uprisings in the aftermath of the First Gulf 
War� Yet it did not hesitate to mass and deploy over a half million troops to push 
Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, or, on a far lesser scale, to invade Panama and 
spirit that country’s military dictator Manuel Noriega to Miami, where he was 
sentenced to forty years in prison� Realists, pace Cohen, do believe in interven-
tion, only that it should be far more selective than what interventionists, whether 
of the neocon or liberal “responsibility to protect” variety, would prefer�
Cohen himself is inconsistent when writing about the Bush team’s policies: in 
one place (p� 5) he states that the 1991 war was an example of “ample quantities” 
of hard power; elsewhere (p� 32) he writes that the United States went to war 
“with the strong belief that it knew the lessons of Vietnam—make wars short, 
violent, conventional and end cleanly,” implying that otherwise Bush would not 
have employed hard power to save Kuwait� Yet Bush and his advisers had no way 
of knowing how long the war would last; in fact, they seriously overestimated 
the capabilities of Iraq’s forces� They also assumed that Hussein might resort to 
chemical weapons; they went ahead and attacked anyway� When Cohen then 
notes that the result of that war was an “escalating military action against a still 
defiant Iraq through the 1990s,” he neglects to point out that the Air Force’s 
operations over both northern and southern Iraq resulted in no losses and with 
monetary costs (not to mention human costs) that were a tiny fraction of those 
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incurred during the 2003 war and its ongoing aftermath� Moreover, it is Cohen 
himself who argues that a key element of hard power is the ongoing deployment 
of forces after fighting has died down, if not ended—which is exactly what Opera-
tions NORTHERN WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH were all about�
Cohen also asserts that realists consider hydrogen bombs to be “the great 
equalizer of international politics” and, in effect, welcome nuclear proliferation� 
This too is a mischaracterization of all but the most extreme positions on this is-
sue� Certainly the George H� W� Bush team did not take that position, nor do the 
vast majority of realist thinkers�
In Cohen’s view, “the most fundamental principle of contemporary realism[—] 
� � � that all states are alike, that they have interests, and will use power to protect 
and further those interests” (p� 12)—is true only to a point� He argues that “even 
a slight knowledge of history” would demonstrate that Hitler was not Bismarck, 
and that the reichsführer was prepared to go to far greater murderous lengths 
than the Iron Chancellor ever would have contemplated� Yet this argument is 
beside the point: it is the very nature of realism to recognize a threat for what it 
is� The British and French in the 1930s refused to recognize the threat that Hitler 
posed, not because they were realists, but because they were appeasers�
Finally, Cohen argues that “realists have trouble taking sub-state or trans-
state actors seriously” and fail to appreciate the intangibles, such as the power of 
faith and ideology� Moreover, when he calls realists “coolly detached secularists 
themselves � � � [who] find it difficult to take seriously talk of caliphates or hid-
den imams” (p� 13), he appears to be referring to the so-called realism of Barack 
Obama, who is not, as it happens, devoid of religious instincts� Indeed, many 
neoconservatives as well as liberal interventionists are themselves highly secular 
and do not have the faintest idea regarding the religious motivation of people in 
other parts of the world, be they substate actors or government officials�
Cohen’s critique of realists, many of whom, such as Scowcroft, opposed the 
intervention in Iraq, does not mean that he views the Iraq War as an unmitigated 
success� Still, even as he bemoans the American missteps in addressing the af-
termath of the 2003 war, he seems to grasp at any opportunity to downplay the 
effects of those missteps� Thus he posits that “behind the intent to overthrow the 
regime was a desire not so much to remake the Arab world altogether, but to in-
flict a blow that would shock it” (p� 35)� It is not at all clear that this was the case� 
For some officials, the intent was indeed to remake the Arab world� For others, it 
was to create a liberal democracy in Iraq, which proved to be nothing more than 
a pipe dream� Cohen also argues that the cost of the war was far less than some 
have estimated� He is probably correct; but nonetheless the opportunity cost of a 
war that consumed at least half a trillion dollars was massive�
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Finally, while Cohen admits that waterboarding and similar techniques were 
politically counterproductive, he argues that they “probably” yielded useful in-
formation� He is correct if referring to a case in which a prisoner had actionable 
intelligence about a so-called ticking bomb� Yet former military officers ranging 
from Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis to Senator John McCain, himself a former 
prisoner of war, insist that more-benign techniques would have been far more 
successful and would not have violated international law—the latter a point that 
Cohen does not address at all�
Ultimately, Cohen acknowledges that the Iraq War was “a mistake,” one that 
cost America dearly in terms of its alliance relationships� But, having argued so 
strenuously against the war’s critics, his admission seems nothing more than a 
grudging concession to reality�
Turning to America’s diminishing military arsenal, Cohen argues vigorously 
for a major naval and long-range aviation buildup, which would be the most ef-
fective way to deter China in particular� He also calls for accelerated moderniza-
tion of the American strategic nuclear arsenal, on the grounds that nuclear weap-
ons actually could be used� China, Iran, North Korea, and others are expanding 
their arsenals; presumably they have not ruled out employing these weapons 
during, or even at the start of, a conflict with an adversary�
Cohen also joins the growing call for significant reform of the Department 
of Defense acquisition system� And he argues for maintaining, and therefore 
funding, America’s network of overseas bases, which not only reassure allies but 
ensure that conventional conflicts will not touch American shores� None of these 
programmatic efforts, he argues, should come at the expense of America’s uncon-
ventional forces, which will continue to be a necessary instrument for fighting 
nonstate actors such as jihadists, as well as for training friendly but less developed 
forces� Indeed, his chapters on the threats that China, Russia, Iran, and jihadists 
pose provide the meat of his argument for hard power and the justification for 
both his policy and programmatic prescriptions�
Cohen stresses the importance of space and cyberspace, which, together with 
the oceans, he terms “the commons,” all of which America is best positioned to 
defend� And he strongly advocates investments to protect American interests in 
all three of those domains� He also calls for American intervention in what he 
labels ungoverned space, meaning states that have collapsed or are on the verge 
of doing so� He recognizes that America cannot intervene in every civil war, but 
seems more willing to have Washington engage in such conflicts if they take place 
in the Middle East than in sub-Saharan Africa�
Cohen’s final chapter is a critique of Caspar Weinberger’s oft-repeated prin-
ciples regarding the use of military force, which first were enunciated in 1984� 
He challenges Weinberger’s assertion that the United States should not commit 
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forces to overseas combat unless they are protecting America’s vital interests or 
those of its allies� He notes that American interventions in Grenada, Bosnia, 
and elsewhere hardly affected those vital interests� Indeed, it can be argued that 
America should not have intervened in Bosnia, just as it did not intervene in 
the far worse situations in Cambodia and Rwanda, where, since genocide was 
involved, the moral imperative for intervention was much stronger� But Wein-
berger presided over the invasion of Grenada because American citizens were 
being held hostage by a regime supported by Communist Cuba; surely, protection 
of the country’s citizens is an American interest� Perhaps Weinberger’s definition 
should now include “friends and partners” as well as allies, but the principle of 
national interest, broadly defined—as it was with respect to Grenada—is still 
sound, unless, as Cohen appears to postulate, the bar for American military in-
tervention overseas should be considerably lower�
Cohen challenges Weinberger’s second condition for intervention, which calls 
for “the clear intention of winning�” Cohen asserts that the term winning is not 
as clear as Weinberger indicates� But Weinberger’s point was that the intention 
should be to win; if not, what exactly should be the reason for committing Ameri-
can blood and treasure to an overseas adventure?
Weinberger’s third point was that America should commit forces to combat 
only if the political and military objectives are clearly defined, and if there is a 
clear understanding of how those forces are to achieve those objectives� In this 
case, Cohen is correct that there is no way to predict the outcome of the use of 
force� Still, there should be a clear sense of why those forces are being committed, 
even if the outcome is uncertain� Indeed, it is arguable that Weinberger was fully 
aware of the difficulty of predicting outcomes; it is evident in his fourth maxim, 
that the relationship between American objectives and the forces committed to 
achieving them must be reassessed continually and adjusted if necessary�
Cohen claims that Weinberger’s fifth principle, that the United States should 
not commit forces to battle without “some reasonable assurance” of popular and 
congressional support, “assumes too much� It is often the case that the American 
people lend their support to successful enterprises and turn away from unsuc-
cessful ones” (p� 215)� Cohen misunderstands Weinberger’s intent; “reasonable 
assurance” is not a guarantee� Weinberger’s point was that if there was significant 
doubt that congressional and popular support would last throughout the lifetime 
of the military intervention, one should question whether to launch it in the first 
place�
Finally, Cohen asserts that Weinberger’s principle that committing U�S� forces 
to combat should be a last resort “falls apart upon close inspection” because “one 
always has the option of giving the enemy what it wants�” It is true that appease-
ment is an option, but Weinberger, who was hardly an appeaser, clearly did not 
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see it as a viable one� Moreover, Cohen implies that the use of military force 
should not be a last resort, yet throughout his volume he advocates the impor-
tance of diplomacy, which the United States presumably should employ prior 
to committing forces overseas� In sum, it is not Weinberger’s principles, which 
reflect the views of most realists, that are not viable; they fall apart only if one 
adopts Cohen’s interventionist philosophy�
Cohen outlines six principles of his own, none of which really contradicts 
Weinberger’s� His first principle is “understand your war for what it is, not what 
you wish it to be”; that is, avoid rigid comparisons with previous conflicts� He is 
correct, of course, but nowhere did Weinberger advocate “fighting the last war,” 
or any previous kind of war, for that matter� Cohen’s second principle calls for 
adaptability as a conflict progresses and its nature changes� In so doing he is echo-
ing Weinberger’s admonition that the relationship between wartime objectives 
and the forces committed to conflict calls for continual reassessment�
Cohen’s third principle is that the nation must be prepared for a long war even 
if its objective is a short one� Weinberger’s emphasis on the importance of clearly 
defined military objectives while stressing the need for reassessing the link be-
tween forces and objectives would appear to indicate, in agreement with Cohen, 
that if a war must be fought for a longer period than originally anticipated to meet 
national objectives, then forces must be committed to that longer-term effort�
Weinberger’s six principles did not address Cohen’s fourth: “while engaging 
in today’s fight, prepare for tomorrow’s challenge�” However, Weinberger cer-
tainly would have agreed with Cohen; the former actually coauthored (with Peter 
Schwei zer) an entire volume on that very subject, entitled The Next War (Regnery, 
1996)� Weinberger identified possible future conflict scenarios with China, North 
Korea, Iran, and Russia (all of which Cohen discusses at length) and even Japan(!) 
(which Cohen does not)� Interestingly, the book’s introduction was written by 
Margaret Thatcher, who as prime minister led her country in a successful war 
that no one anticipated, the 1982 Falklands conflict, and who herself identified 
yet another potential threat that Cohen addresses, that of Islamic extremists�
Weinberger also would have agreed with Cohen’s fifth principle: “adroit 
strategy matters; perseverance usually matters more�” The former Secretary of 
Defense simply put it differently when he asserted that “if we decide to put troops 
in a combat situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear inten-
tion of winning�” Winning may well mean something different in the twenty-first 
century than in Weinberger’s day, but if that is not the objective, why expect the 
nation to persevere?
Indeed, Cohen himself refers to winning in his final principle: “a president 
can launch a war; to win it, he or she must sustain congressional and popular 
support�” Weinberger’s principle on this account was not really all that different: 
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he simply stated that a president should not commit forces to combat “without 
reasonable assurance” of popular and congressional support� As already noted, 
“reasonable assurance” is not a cast-iron guarantee� It calls for constant monitor-
ing to validate that assurance—exactly as Cohen requires�
That Cohen’s disagreements with Weinberger may be less substantive than he 
feels they are should not detract from the value of his own set of principles� In-
deed, the breadth of Cohen’s book is striking, and his analyses are always cogent� 
Finally, agree with him or not, Cohen makes one of the strongest cases on record 
for a robust interventionist policy� If for no other reason, his book should be 
required reading for analysts, strategists, and policy makers when they evaluate 
options for strengthening what is perceived widely as America’s currently dimin-
ished influence on the world stage�
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